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 [*321] In the parlance of the Supreme Court of the United States, the university classroom is a 
quintessential marketplace of ideas. n1 Exposure to the robust exchange of ideas, said to take 
place there, plays a vital role in the nation's future as evidenced in the development of its next 
generation of leaders. n2 "To impose any straight jacket" upon this marketplace, the Court held, 
would imperil this future, stagnating and halting progress. n3 
 [*322] In 1957 and 1967, when the Supreme Court was crafting this argument, the feared 
straight jacket included government-imposed employment dismissals for the content of 
classroom lectures as well as membership in recognized subversive organizations. n4 Such 
sanctions, the Court reasoned, would ultimately chill academic discussion and inhibit 
scholarship. n5 For only a classroom largely free of government interference could secure a 
marketplace conducive to diverse, robust debate and the production of new discoveries and 
advancements. 
Forty years later, national activists, including David Horowitz, and organizations, such as the 
American Council of Trustees and Alumni, view the classroom in a much different light. They 
contend that "professors indoctrinate students in left-wing ideology and penalize undergraduates 
with conservative views." n6 As a result, they have been calling on state legislatures and 
university administrators to adopt policies and report on steps taken to encourage intellectual 
diversity and protect political and cultural minorities from faculty bias and academic retribution 
in the classroom and other university settings. n7 In response, lawmakers in several states have 
introduced measures designed to encourage intellectual diversity in the university system, n8 
while trustees at two universities have either approved statements that address extraneous 
classroom speech and/or instituted streamlined procedures for student complaints regarding such 
conduct. n9 In  [*323] Pennsylvania, a special committee of the state's legislature spent a year 
investigating "complaints that liberal professors had treated conservative students unfairly" and 
recommended that state universities "ensure that students' rights to free speech are protected." n10 
Pennsylvania universities have also been the target of two lawsuits that have been filed for 
policies and actions students allege violated their First Amendments rights through the 
suppression of intolerant speech and a campaign of retribution for ideological differences. n11 
These actions occurred after the American Council on Education and twenty-nine other higher 
education organizations issued "a statement of principles upon which academic rights and 
responsibilities are based." n12 Among the key principles included in the statement is a 
commitment to encourage debate over complex and difficult issues in an open and tolerant 
environment as well as access to a "clear institutional process" by "any member of the campus 
community" for unfair treatment on academic matters. n13 The statement, a response to the 
"increasing criticism for a lack of commitment to political and intellectual pluralism" on college 
campuses, n14 drew criticism of its own from the American Federation of Teachers and some 
members of the America Association of University Professors -- an organization that signed on 
to the statement -- for weakening to defend against lawmakers and activists who seek to meddle 
in academe. n15 
 [*324] Meddling in academe has now largely taken the form of a government-imposed annual 
report on the specific measures an institution is taking to ensure intellectual diversity and the free 
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exchange of ideas. n16 Among the measures to be included in the report are steps the institution is 
taking to: 
. Incorporate intellectual diversity into institutional statements, grievance procedures and 
activities on diversity; 
. Include intellectual diversity concerns in the institution's guidelines on teaching and program 
development; 
. Include intellectual diversity issues in student course evaluations; 
. Develop hiring, tenure and promotion policies that protect individuals against political 
viewpoint discrimination and track any reported grievances in that regard. n17 
To fulfill these measures, the American Council on Trustees and Alumni recommends amending 
faculty handbooks to "make it clear that professors should not use the classroom for 
proselytizing, should present alternative points of view fairly, should assign readings 
representing multiple views, [and] treat students who have different points of view with respect." 
n18 Students who believe they have been "discriminated against because of their political views" 
should be able to "file formal grievances against professors who abuse 'faculty authority' by 
pressuring students 'into supporting a political or social cause.'" n19 
 [*325] So what has happened to the academic marketplace n20 of ideas since the late 1960s? Is 
academe in need of a hands-on government policy to induce and ensure diversity of viewpoint in 
the classroom and other academic settings? At the core of this debate is a power struggle over 
who will ultimately govern the university. Some fear that political bodies will take over the 
responsibility of making curricular and hiring decisions n21 and enforcing specific rules of 
fairness and decorum on college campuses. n22 In a speech before the Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York, Lee Bollinger, president of Columbia University, called on universities to 
"stand firm in insisting" that the academy "must remain a system of self-governance." n23 But 
who would win a constitutional showdown between the academy and those seeking to infuse 
academic discourse with alternative viewpoints? 
Based on an analysis of the First Amendment concerns at stake in this ongoing controversy, this 
article concludes that university administrators should have the upper hand in such a 
constitutional challenge given the specific characteristics and selective nature of the academic 
marketplace. n24 Despite Supreme Court parlance to the contrary, the academic marketplace 
simply does not function as a place of open exchange and robust discussion. n25 As a result, 
forced inclusion of specific perspectives and viewpoints runs counter to the nature of a university 
and distorts its ability to eradicate flawed concepts, theories, ideas and viewpoints from its 
curriculum and the scholarship it produces. n26 A university's power to control its operations -- 
namely access to its limited public forums, the content of the education it provides and the 
speech required for the proper functioning of university programs -- lies at  [*326] the center of 
this debate. And while the head-on collision between a university and its legislative funding 
source present complicated First Amendment issues, this article argues that courts will most 
likely defer to the judgment of university administrators in a constitutional challenge to an 
intellectual diversity mandate. n27 
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The analysis upon which this conclusion was reached begins with an overview of the theoretical 
characteristics and relationship between the Holmesian notion of the ideas marketplace and an 
academic marketplace. The article next explores a university's ability to control access to the 
various "forums" it manages, then examines the protection provided by the employee speech and 
academic freedom doctrines on participants in this dispute. Finally, the article examines the 
ability of a legislature to place restrictions on speech in exchange for the funds it provides a 
governmental program. The article concludes that the level of autonomy provided by these areas 
of First Amendment law should give administrators the upper hand in a constitutional challenge. 
 
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS 
Embedded in American jurisprudence since Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced the 
concept in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, n28 the marketplace of ideas theory rests on the 
premise that the proper evolution of intellectual, political, scientific and philosophical thought 
can only be achieved if the exercise of speech is uninhibited by governmental interference. 
Government suppression of speech is, according to this concept, more dangerous to the proper 
functioning of society than ideas -- even those ideas the vast majority believes are harmful, false 
and "fraught with evil." n29 Such ideas are not to be feared because the marketplace is self-
correcting. In an unregulated marketplace of ideas, full and free discussion will eventually 
expose harmful ideas for what they are, and a rational citizenry will eventually reject them. The 
marketplace model, rooted in laissez-faire economic theory, maintains that truth will emerge in 
the long run. n30 But, as economists have pointed out, people live in the short run, n31 where the 
inherent inequality in the marketplace manifests itself. 
 [*327] Scholarly critics of the Holmesian notion of the marketplace have recognized the 
"inequality in the power to communicate ideas." n32 In 1967, Jerome A. Barron argued that while 
First Amendment law provides protection for expression once it has come to the fore, it is 
"indifferent to creating opportunities for expression." n33 This indifference prevents "novel and 
unpopular ideas" from ever reaching the marketplace n34 and "perpetuates the freedom of [the] 
few" who can obtain access to it. n35 For Barron, access to the marketplace was largely controlled 
by the mass media. The First Amendment, which provides the media with editorial control, 
became a functioning rationale for a communications industry that needed to repress unpalatable 
ideas in order to maximize profits. n36 The system, Barron contended, created a marketplace 
which operated in a manner largely averse to securing uninhibited debate on public issues. n37 
Barron's critique still resonates as multiple entrenched interests exert control over and conflict 
with the Holmesian notion of the marketplace. n38 These dominant groups have "relatively 
complete access to the market" n39 and, as a result, have a greater opportunity to reach an 
extended audience and shape public debate. n40 Large majorities of individuals and organizations, 
whose access is restricted, experience little success at reaching a large audience and, therefore, 
view the market process as inherently biased and flawed. n41 In order to correct this shortcoming, 
a number of scholars have called for "some form of governmentally enforced right of access" 
that would provide adequate entry to the marketplace for those otherwise shut out of the process. 
n42 
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Government-mandated access into a marketplace is largely at issue in the intellectual diversity 
debate. Supporters of legislative action cite studies that show a "marked political imbalance 
among college faculty"  [*328] as evidence of a malfunctioning marketplace. n43 Results from 
one such study indicate that a "sharp shift to the left has taken place among college faculty in 
recent years." n44 The study reported that 72% of professors teaching at American universities 
and colleges identify themselves as liberal or left of center, whereas 15% identify themselves as 
conservative or right of center. n45 This figure represents a sharp increase from a 1984 Carnegie 
study that found 39% of faculty members identified themselves as liberal and 34% identified 
themselves as conservative. n46 When compared to a Harris Poll on the political leanings of the 
general public, the figure is further skewed, as, in both 1999 and 2004, 18% of Americans 
defined themselves as liberal, whereas 37% (1999) and 34% (2004) identified themselves as 
conservative. n47 As to party affiliation, 50% of faculty members surveyed identified themselves 
as Democrats and 11% identified themselves as Republican. n48 The largest disparity in left v. 
right was seen among faculty in English literature, where 88% identified as liberal and 3% as 
conservative. n49 
The charge that liberal or left-leaning thinkers dominate universities was also demonstrated in 
the attitudes of American college faculty on specific social and political issues. The results 
revealed that 88% favor greater environmental protection, even at the cost of price increases or 
job losses; 84% are pro-choice; 67% believe a homosexual lifestyle is as acceptable as a 
heterosexual lifestyle; 75% endorse cohabitation without marital intensions; 72% favor 
government action to reduce income inequality; and 66% believe government should work to 
ensure full employment. n50 
Proponents of government intervention fear that the imbalance in ideology will unduly influence 
a generation of students, indoctrinating them with a "politically correct" point of view. n51 This 
fear coincides with the findings of scholars who argue that dominant values in which a public has 
been "indoctrinated or socialized will prevail, and speakers  [*329] with stature, influence, and 
skill will still be more persuasive than those without" such qualities. n52 In other words, market 
outputs are biased in favor of the dominant values of certain individuals who are able to exercise 
particular influence when they communicate. n53 Correction of this imbalance, then, demands not 
only greater access to the marketplace but also an enhanced degree of stature, influence and skill 
for new entrants. n54 A system, which would guarantee equal access without a means to elevate 
the stature of new entrants, would prove insufficient to correct marketplace bias as it would 
create access for individuals who simply have little ability to persuade an audience. n55 However, 
equal access and stature do not necessarily guarantee that the viewpoints held by a few will 
prevail over the viewpoints held by the majority. n56 
In a university, as in the marketplace at large, the central commitment is to the discovery of truth. 
But unlike the Holmesian marketplace, truth in the academy is viewed largely as a provisional 
and evolutionary expression of "knowledge, precepts, or hypotheses tentatively established" n57 
through disinterested inquiry and the process of peer review. n58 Ideally, in this environment, 
ideas that constrain rational discussion or have been rejected through a repeated process  [*330] 
of methodological investigation and analysis have no value or status. n59 This criterion forms a 
barrier to entry into the academic marketplace and functions as a yardstick against which ideas 
and viewpoints are measured. Within the academic marketplace, then, all ideas are not equal. 
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This deviation from the Holmesian notion of the marketplace manifested itself in the debate 
concerning campus hate speech codes. 
An outgrowth of a series of racist incidents on college campuses in the late 1980s, campus hate 
speech codes were an attempt to restrict harmful speech and maintain a nonhostile learning 
environment conducive to producing an equal educational opportunity for all students. n60 By the 
early 1990s, restrictions on offensive speech flourished on college and university campuses, and 
support for punishing such speech was unprecedented. n61 This movement, interestingly, came on 
the heels of a trend toward greater protection of offensive speech n62 as major civil rights 
organizations as well as the courts concluded that the "interests of racial minorities and 
powerless groups were best protected through the broadest, most content-neutral protection of 
speech." n63 
Scholarly examination of the campus speech code movement has exposed the contrasting 
purposes and characteristics of these two marketplaces. The Holmesian marketplace, which was 
designed to foster  [*331] democratic objectives through public discourse, is perpetually open to 
participation, question and reevaluation. n64 By contrast, the primary function of discourse in the 
academic marketplace is "'to discover and disseminate knowledge by means of teaching and 
research.'" n65 This function supports the educational purpose of the academy and relies upon the 
free exchange of ideas to accomplish its objectives. But while public discourse in the academic 
marketplace is valued, it is valued only to a point, and discourse that is incompatible with the 
academy's commitment to advance knowledge and truth may well be censored or excluded. n66 
In the context of hate speech, scholars have argued that racial insults and the like have no status 
or value among academic discourse n67 given the inability of such speech to "establish, improve, 
or criticize any proposition or object of inquiry." n68 Racist speech is "communicated solely for 
the purpose of harassing, humiliating, or degrading a victim," n69 and possesses no "truth value" 
n70 and thus is not able to "form part of the truth-seeking dialogue" n71 of the academy. While the 
pursuit of truth, in the academic context, requires unfettered access to all ideas no matter how 
offensive, this pursuit is also tempered by "fidelity to reason and respect for method and 
procedures" n72 and precludes any commitment to tolerate expression incompatible with 
academic goals. n73 
Within the speech code debate, the academic marketplace has been characterized as something of 
a hybrid forum or special kind of community, n74 where "individuals learn to express themselves 
in acceptable, civil terms." n75 In this type of environment, "higher levels of rationality and 
civility" n76 are required of speakers in an effort to acquire the  [*332] self-restraint necessary to 
function in a civilized, pluralistic society. n77 This depiction of the academic marketplace takes 
into account the significant role diversity in race, ethnicity and culture play within the academy. 
n78 Efforts to promote diversity have been linked to America's nongovernmental accreditation 
system, in which the vast majority of higher education institutions choose to participate and on 
which federal student aid eligibility depends. n79 These efforts are also reflected in recent gains in 
college enrollment among female and minority students, a trend, with regard to women, that is 
expected to continue until 2016, according to the U.S. Department of Education's National 
Center for Education Statistics. n80 
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More than a decade ago, Professor Samuel Walker commented on the changes such efforts have 
had on the campus community. "Campuses," he wrote, "represent a special environment where 
groups that are relatively powerless in the larger society have been able to mobilize considerable 
power based not only on their own numbers but on the coalitions they have forged with other 
groups and allies from the 'majority' community." n81 Effective coalitions have been formed 
among minority groups, and are actively supported by "left-wing white students" and passively 
supported by "many other unaffiliated students." n82 At the same time, Professor Walker 
explained, advocates of free speech, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, have not 
seriously challenged such coalitions or politically correct discourse requirements because they 
have been organizationally weak on campus. n83 "The resulting coalition," he wrote, "has far 
more power on campus than any of the constituent groups have in the larger society." n84 
In many ways, the academic marketplace is more of a social and economic creation cabined by 
prevailing conceptions of what constitutes a legitimate exchange of ideas than an equal-access 
public square where wide open and robust debate on public issues takes place. Consequently, 
 [*333] it is not free of market imperfections. Like other economic marketplaces, it is 
unavoidably biased in favor of those with the resources and stature to control it. Those 
individuals and groups able to exert control over the academic marketplace enjoy an enormously 
disparate opportunity to peddle their ideas to an often captive audience even though the ideas 
posited are not necessarily reflective of their relative acceptance in the larger society. While 
critics point to such disparate access as evidence that a regulatory regime is needed to correct 
market imperfections and redistribute communicative opportunity, in economic terms such 
individuals and groups do not exert monopoly power over the idea market. 
A monopoly in the marketplace of ideas is said to occur where "a single individual (or firm) has 
control over the majority of avenues of communication, where a small number of firms have the 
same control, or where time limitations grant a speaker exclusive ability to address a particular 
audience." n85 Examples include situations where one or two firms owned all television access 
and television was the sole method of disseminating information to viewers or where an 
individual convinced a group to commit an act of violence before any opposing viewpoints could 
be heard. n86 While idea markets are subject to potential monopolies in certain circumstances, n87 
a natural monopoly in an idea market would be extremely rare given the proliferation of 
communication outlets or sufficient substitutes and the resulting low information barriers made 
possible by Internet-based search engines that are necessary to ascertain the merit of an idea. 
Certainly within the academic marketplace, sufficient substitutes exist even for those students 
who seek a more conservative ideology. n88 According to recent enrollment figures, conservative, 
faith-based institutions are experiencing unprecedented growth. Evangelical schools belonging to 
the Council of Christian Colleges and Universities reported a 70% increase from 1990 to 2004 
compared to a  [*334] 13% increase for all public institutions and 28% for all private colleges 
over the same period. n89 
Aside from access issues, what advocates of regulation seem to fear the most about the academic 
marketplace are its perceived externalities, that is, the effects on third parties and society from 
the exchange process. In economic parlance, the classic example of a negative externality is 
pollution. n90 Consumers demand certain products, the production of which produces air or water 
pollution. Third parties and society are negatively affected by the polluted air and water that 
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results. In such a situation, government intervention, which mandates that the producer install a 
pollution abatement system, for example, may be appropriate to correct this defect in the market. 
Negative externalities in the idea markets may also occur. A classic example is when speech is 
used to compel harmful conduct, such as incitement to violence or destruction of property. In the 
intellectual diversity debate, it can be surmised that left-leaning academic indoctrination could 
ultimately impact cultural and political norms as generations of graduates armed with liberal 
ideas and so-called politically correct notions begin to participate in the ideas market. However, 
this supposition assumes that society is harmed from liberal ideas and politically correct notions 
in a manner similar to pollution or incitement to violence and that such indoctrination takes 
place, that is, that diversity of thought is basically nonexistent within the entire academic system 
and that academic speech is capable of unduly influencing a student's thought process to a degree 
necessary for indoctrination to occur. Both of these assumptions are difficult, at best, to defend. 
In economic terms, liberal ideology, even assuming that graduates have internalized it to the 
degree necessary to sway the ideas market, does not rise to the level of a negative externality. 
Furthermore, statistics show that while so-called liberal thought dominates the academic 
marketplace, n91 the system is not closed to conservative viewpoints and institutions. n92 
Commentators caution against using economic theory as a means to understand and explain 
Holmes' marketplace of ideas. n93 Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to adhere to 
economic theory when  [*335] deciding free speech issues, n94 use of the theory in such disputes 
invariably focuses attention on disparities and externalities and provides justification for 
governmental intervention to redistribute communicative opportunity. n95 The Court's hesitancy 
in this regard may come from the observation that the market for ideas and the market for goods 
and services do not function in a similar fashion. Economic concepts such as supply and demand, 
scarcity of resources, substitution effects, price, and consumer choice do not operate in the ideas 
market the way they do in markets for goods and services. n96 Ideas often get consumed in ways 
not replicated for material goods and services. For example, the production and consumption of 
an idea is not generated in response to demand and does not deplete the resources available to the 
producer of the idea or the supply of the idea to other consumers. n97 Consumers of ideas do not 
necessarily seek out ideas that best serve their personal needs. In deciding what to believe, 
consumers often take into account the desires, needs, opinions and experiences of other people. 
n98 They may also adopt ideas that defy current consensus and are, thus, very costly to hold. n99 
Holding a genuine belief, therefore, "[E] ntails a quality of personal identification and (at least 
temporary) commitment that is approximated by only the most unusual of consumer choices." 
n100 The result is a market-place distorted by cultural affinities and psychological predispositions 
as well as by the fact that some ideas are more easily packaged and articulated than others. n101 
As a segment of the ideas market, the academic marketplace is distorted by the educational 
mission of the university as well as the university's commitment to a rational pursuit of truth and 
the intellectual development of its students. These commitments constrain the production and 
consumption of ideas. In an academic marketplace, ideas are produced primarily for other 
scholars and students who understand and evaluate those ideas "within a tradition of knowledge, 
 [*336] shared assumptions and arguments about methodology and criteria, and common 
objectives of exploration or discovery." n102 In this market-place, speech is "rigidly formalistic." 
n103 That is, "Every lecture or article must presuppose the history and current canon of the 
discipline; every departure from common understandings must be explained and justified." n104 
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Scholars who reach conclusions that challenge the basic suppositions of a discipline are often 
held to higher standards of competence in order to maintain the coherence of a discipline. n105 
However, those who successfully establish a new perspective often become leaders within the 
discipline. n106 
Supporters of the intellectual diversity movement have raised objections to disciplinary 
coherence. They contend that individual disciplines, which were once distinct, are now becoming 
homogenized around a core set of political values and a set list of topics, namely "race, class, 
gender, sexuality, and the 'social construction identity'; globalization, capitalism, and U.S. 
'hegemony; the ubiquity of oppression and the destruction of the environment." n107 Faculty, they 
say, are too often telling students what to think about present day issues. n108 Ideologically 
slanted classroom speech that claims that the status quo is "patriarchal, racist, hegemonic, and 
capitalist" and must be critiqued in order to facilitate a necessary social transformation has 
supplanted survey courses that ensured exposure to general areas of knowledge. n109 The 
academic marketplace, they contend, should foster disciplinary and viewpoint diversity n110 and 
an open and free exchange of ideas in the classroom that permits students to think for 
themselves. n111 Moreover faculty scholarship should be reviewed for "accuracy, impartiality, 
and probity" regardless of the discipline or methodological tradition. n112 
The arguments put forth from advocates of the intellectual diversity movement are based on a 
flawed view of the academic marketplace. As a segment of the ideas market, the academic 
marketplace is more  [*337] analogous to Professor Barron's news media environment than to 
the neutral environment of free and voluntary exchange envisioned by the Holmesian notion of 
the marketplace. The academic marketplace simply does not function as an open public forum 
where all ideas are equal and the barriers to entry are virtually nonexistent. As one commentator 
argued, describing the academic marketplace as "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas"' n113 
"obscures more than it clarifies." n114 When this Holmesian notion is applied to the classroom, it 
"falsely suggest [s] that teaching normally involves a free exchange of ideas among equals." n115 
When it is applied to the development of disciplinary knowledge, it fails to account for the fact 
that ideas in the academic marketplace "achieve eminence only to the extent that competent 
scholars accept them upon due and unconstrained examination." n116 
Confusion regarding the marketplace metaphor is not new. Despite its repeated appearance in 
Supreme Court opinions, judicial references to it "are virtually devoid of definitions of the term 
or explanations as to how the model works." n117 The metaphor, which has been used in virtually 
every area of First Amendment jurisprudence to bolster free expression, n118 "is far from being 
accepted as a workable means of protecting speech" by nonjurists and scholars. n119 Critics 
contend that the theory operates on false assumptions. Among the most common are that 
"everyone has access to the market" and that "truth is objective and discoverable rather than 
subjective and chosen or created." n120 However, such criticisms are "almost universally" based 
on the idea of a single marketplace that is open to everyone and into which all ideas are dumped. 
n121 This image of the marketplace is not supported by First Amendment jurisprudence, which 
has recognized a multitude of mini-marketplaces from distinct places such as classrooms and 
mail systems to types of media to categories of speech. n122 In First Amendment jurisprudence, 
each of these marketplaces comes to the Court with "its own dynamics, parameters,  [*338] 
regulatory scheme, and audience." n123 As a result, ideas don't enter an all-encompassing 
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marketplace where they battle it out with a whole host of other ideas but rather enter a particular 
marketplace where they compete with other ideas in a more limited and controlled manner. n124 
For many, the principal distinguishing characteristic of the academic marketplace is unfettered 
expressive freedom. n125 However, this point of view does not take into account the realities of 
that marketplace. The academic marketplace functions neither as an economic marketplace 
driven by laws of supply and demand nor as a wide-open, uninhibited marketplace where 
multitudes of differing ideas can clash. At its core, it is a closed community of scholars and 
administrators committed to expression that advances knowledge. Knowledge, in this 
community, is largely based on the collective judgment of those scholars and administrators who 
whose work conforms to the standards set and accepted by the academic marketplace. Members 
who are granted access to this ideas market are expected to embrace the collective judgment of 
their peers and engage in contemplative and rational discussions regarding the areas of 
knowledge in and the established critical perspectives of their discipline. Licensing all 
expression or granting unrestricted access to the academic marketplace, however, simply does 
not foster this philosophy. 
 
ACCESS TO VARIOUS UNIVERSITY "FORUMS" 
The recognition of a series of mini-marketplaces has allowed First Amendment jurisprudence to 
vary, depending on the marketplace in question. n126 In its physical form, the academic 
marketplace is best characterized as an amalgamation of diverse places that are, most likely, 
spread across a large area. From its football stadium to its classrooms and administrative offices, 
the academic marketplace constitutes a government-owned community that is governed for First 
Amendment purposes by the public forum doctrine. The Court developed this doctrine to 
adjudicate issues of access to and expressive conduct on government property. In order to engage 
in public forum analysis, a court must first  [*339] identify the place or forum to which the 
speaker is seeking access. For example, if a speaker seeks general access to any and all areas of a 
campus, then the forum, for First Amendment analysis purposes, encompasses the entire campus. 
But when a speaker seeks access to a more limited forum, such as a classroom or an internal mail 
system, that particular place is the appropriate forum for analysis regardless of whether the place 
has an actual physical or spatial form. n127 From the Court's application of the public forum 
doctrine, it is clear that a variety of forums can exist within a single piece of governmental 
property. n128 
Under the public forum doctrine, the degree to which government can constitutionally control 
access to and restrict expression occurring on its property will depend upon the degree to which 
the specific place to which the speaker seeks to gain access is deemed a public or nonpublic 
forum. n129 In determining the nature of a forum, courts have generally divided government 
property into three categories: traditional public, designated public and nonpublic forums. n130 
Distinctions between these forums are based upon the "physical characteristics of the property, 
including its location; . . . the objective use and purposes of the property; . . . and government 
intent and policy with respect to the property, which may be evidenced by its historic and 
traditional treatment." n131 In places traditionally devoted to public assembly and debate, such as 
public streets, sidewalks and parks, as well as places intentionally designated by government fiat 
as an open public forum, n132 government's ability to regulate expressive activity is subjected to 
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the highest scrutiny. n133 In these forums, content-based restrictions on speech, including 
speaker-identity based exclusions, are valid only if the regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling government interest and is  [*340] narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. n134 In 
addition, content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions on expressive activities are 
permitted as long as the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest 
and ample alternative channels of communication exist. n135 
Public property that is not deemed a traditional public forum or a designated open public forum 
is considered a nonpublic forum n136 and is governed by a different standard. n137 Government 
may restrict access to or limit expressive activity in a nonpublic forum as long as the regulation 
is reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and the surrounding circumstances. n138 And 
while the regulation need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation, n139 
"reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic forum . . . will not save a regulation that is 
in reality a facade for viewpoint-discrimination." n140 A nonpublic forum distinction, therefore, 
would allow government to exclude a speaker who would disrupt such a forum and impede its 
effectiveness for its intended purpose as long as the exclusion was based on viewpoint-neutral 
criteria. n141 
While the forum analysis traditionally has recognized three categories, the law has become 
somewhat murky by the Court's use of a fourth designation, the limited public forum, n142 and 
questions concerning the precise distinction, if any, between a limited public forum and a 
designated public forum or nonpublic forum. n143 This ambiguity has  [*341] even hampered the 
ability of litigants to accurately and explicitly determine the category of forum to which they are 
seeking or denying access. n144 Regardless of the exact term used, courts have recognized 
government's ability to open a nonpublic forum for unlimited or limited expressive conduct. 
When government creates a limited public forum, it restricts expressive activity to certain kinds 
of speakers or groups or the discussion of certain topics. n145 When it creates an unlimited public 
forum, expressive activity is not restricted to a particular subject or speaker; instead the forum is 
open for indiscriminate public use. In practice, however, government rarely creates such a forum 
and thus the terms designated and limited public forum are, today, used largely interchangeably 
to refer to a nonpublic forum that has been opened only to a certain class of speakers and/or for 
the discussion of a particular subject. n146 
Once government creates a limited public forum, it is under no obligation to retain it for the 
purposes for which it was initially established. The Court has held that unlike with a traditional 
public forum,  [*342] government is "not required to indefinitely retain the open character" of 
the forums it creates. n147 Thus a forum initially designated for a specific limited use can later be 
closed or modified to permit an alternative limited use. This provision gives government the 
power to "alter the parameters of the forum at any time, so long as those parameters are 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral." n148 Under the public forum doctrine, it is clear that a 
university would have the authority, for example, to set aside a classroom during a certain period 
of time for discussion of current events by all students. However, if the university concludes, for 
the sake of argument, that contentious and racist speech is occurring around the issue of 
immigration, what is the likelihood it could legitimately change the designation of the forum to 
exclude that subject matter or prohibit certain groups who are more prone to discussing that 
subject from gaining access? 
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A lack of First Amendment constraints in the public forum doctrine has, on the one hand, given 
government the "ability to build discriminatory criteria into the very definition or purpose of the 
limited public forum." n149 Even when relying on definitions of viewpoint supplied by the Court, 
such as expression that communicates an offensive or disfavored attitude n150 or speech 
representing a particular perspective, n151 an exclusionary forum policy or practice "can easily be 
recast by the state as innocent boundary-drawing necessary to preserve the forum for its intended 
purpose." n152 On the other hand, restrictions that prohibit access to a forum by an entire group 
that holds a particular position on an issue can legitimately be perceived as viewpoint 
discrimination. The inherent difficulty of distinguishing between unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination and legitimate speaker- or subject-based discrimination was recognized by the 
Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia. n153 In the case, the 
Court acknowledged that viewpoint discrimination is but a subset of the more general 
phenomenon of content discrimination and that the line between permissible content 
discrimination and impermissible viewpoint discrimination "is not a precise one " n154 
 [*343] When government opens a nonpublic forum to limited use it must abide by the 
boundaries it has set for that forum. These boundaries as well as the circumstances surrounding 
the case are used to determine whether the actual rationale for the restriction was based on the 
ideology, opinion or perspective of the speaker. n155 In a series of cases involving restricted 
access to educational facilities for religious groups, the forum's exclusionary boundaries were 
defined in broad terms. Educational facilities were prohibited from being used for religious 
activities or by any groups for religious purposes. n156 These exclusionary boundaries were 
thought to be viewpoint neutral because they could be applied in an even-handed way to all uses 
of public educational property for any religious purpose regardless of orientation or ideology. n157 
The various educational institutions contended, in one way or another, that they were seeking to 
exclude religious thought from the limited public forum in order to preserve the secular 
educational mission of the institution involved. n158 This action is consistent with the Court's 
public forum doctrine, which gives government explicit authority to legally preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is dedicated. n159 But while the educational institutions 
were classifying religious thought as an area of inquiry or subject matter, the Court contended 
that it is also a perspective or viewpoint on a wide range of topics that were permitted to be 
discussed in the established limited public forums. n160 Therefore, by excluding religious groups 
or speakers who had a religious purpose for seeking entry into the limited forum, government 
was actually discriminating on basis of viewpoint. The fact that "all religions and all uses for 
religious purposes are treated alike," the Court said, "does not answer the critical question [of] 
whether [the exclusion] discriminates on basis of viewpoint." n161 
 [*344] So what about the hypothetical posed earlier involving the topic of immigration? 
Elimination of any group professing a pro-or conimmigration stance from the limited public 
forum created would, according to the Rosenberger Court, skew the debate. n162 In Rosenberger, 
the Court said that debate is not bipolar. For example, antireligious speech is not the only 
response to religious speech. Instead debate on a topic involves multiple perspectives, including 
political, economic and social perspectives in addition to religious and antireligious. n163 To 
exclude all groups with a demonstrated ideology on immigration, for example, while leaving 
room for multiple other voices would skew the marketplace in multiple ways. n164 For a group's 
ideology on immigration could impact its viewpoints on a host of other related issues, from 
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agricultural subsidies to terrorism. To exclude those groups or the topic of immigration itself 
would be to exclude an immigration-based viewpoint from debate on a series of topics related to 
it. Furthermore, if the university, in an attempt to eliminate racist or contentious speech, 
excluded expression that insults or provokes violence, hatred, contempt or similar emotions, this, 
too, could be considered viewpoint-specific, as it would prohibit a racist or bigoted perspective 
but not a tolerant ideology. n165 At this rate, almost any explicit subject-based or speaker-based 
restriction could be regarded as viewpoint specific and thus unconstitutional under the public 
forum analysis. 
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. South-worth, n166 the Court 
avoided the question of whether it would consider an exclusion of politically partisan speech to 
be viewpoint discrimination. n167 At issue was a mandatory university student fee that was used 
to support registered student organizations. n168 Several students objected to the policy, arguing 
that it forced them to support speech with which they disagreed. n169 The Court found that the 
"standard of viewpoint neutrality found in the public forum cases" to be controlling in this case. 
n170 Although the policy stated that fee funds could not be used for politically partisan speech, 
n171 fees were used to fund such groups as the College Democrats and College Republicans, 
among other politically partisan  [*345] groups. n172 The Court concluded that the policy was 
viewpoint neutral without specifically addressing whether the exclusion would be considered 
viewpoint discrimination, that is, partisan versus nonpartisan speech, if the university had abided 
by the letter of the policy. n173 Under the Court's "far-reaching formulation of viewpoint 
discrimination," one commentator contends, "politics could never be restricted as a subject 
matter in a limited public forum, because speech that is not political is, by definition, apolitical. 
By simply funding the Chess Club, the university could be seen as favoring a nonpartisan world 
view." n174 
In spite of this line of reasoning regarding viewpoint discrimination, the Court has upheld 
restrictions on political speech under its public forum analysis. In Greer v. Spock, n175 the 
challenged regulation explicitly excluded "demonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, 
political speeches and similar activities" from the Fort Dix Military Reservation. n176 The 
regulation, which was rigidly n177 and evenhandedly n178 enforced, was intended to keep official 
military activities "wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind." 
n179 The Court wrote, "Such a policy is wholly consistent with the American constitutional 
tradition of a politically-neutral military establishment." n180 
The Court continued this line of reasoning in Cornelius v. NAACP. n181 At issue in Cornelius 
was a presidential order that excluded certain "legal defense and political advocacy 
organizations" from participating in an annual charity drive aimed at federal employees and 
conducted in the federal workplace during working hours. n182 The government argued that the 
fund raising campaign was intended to "provide a means for traditional health and welfare 
charities to solicit contributions in the federal workplace" n183 and that excluding legal defense 
and political advocacy organizations was reasonable in light of the "likely . . . consensus among 
employees that traditional health and welfare charities are worthwhile." n184 In addition, the 
government wished to "avoid the reality  [*346] and appearance of ... favoritism or 
entanglement" with organizations "seeking to affect the outcome of elections or the 
determination of public policy" n185 as well as any controversy that would disrupt the workplace 
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and adversely affect the fund drive. n186 Although the fund drive provided access to organizations 
such as the World Wildlife Fund and Wilderness Society that did not provide health and welfare 
services, the Court up-held the regulation, contending that the policy was reasonable in light of 
the purpose of the fund drive and that the justifications for the exclusions were "facially neutral." 
n187 However, the Court admitted that justifications, such as a concern to avoid controversy, 
might actually conceal a viewpoint bias. n188 Nonetheless, the Court declined to decide whether 
such a bias existed, leaving the excluded groups free to demonstrate on remand that 
government's restrictions were "impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a particular 
point of view." n189 
So how can the Court's findings of viewpoint discrimination in cases involving the exclusion of 
religious activities from a limited public forum be squared against its decisions upholding the 
elimination of political speech from similar forums? The answer may very well turn on the 
established function performed by the forum. Court cases suggest that a lighter version of the 
viewpoint discrimination test is applied to restrictions that exist primarily for the attainment of 
legitimate administrative or institutional purposes. Although an administrative or institutional 
function is not a specific criterion for distinguishing among forums, restrictions in such forums 
n190 are often upheld as long as they  [*347] are facially neutral or evenhandedly applied, n191 
whereas courts have rejected such a justification n192 in forums where the primary function is to 
facilitate discussion, albeit in a limited manner. n193 When the purpose of the forum is to facilitate 
discussion on multiple topics in a wide-ranging and often unstructured manner, the Court is 
likely to find that the exclusion of an entire speaker or subject category constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination because such a category may also constitute a perspective on permitted forum 
topics n194 or the category itself is technically not placed off limits for other speakers. n195 
However, this often is not the case with forums designed to facilitate an administrative or 
institutional function because such forums are generally established under more specific and 
narrow guidelines that routinely and unavoidably  [*348] constrain speech on the basis of both 
its content and viewpoint. n196 While this functional dichotomy is good news for a military base, 
for example, which for administrative purposes must maintain "loyalty, discipline, [and] morale" 
n197 and insulate itself from any appearance of partisanship, n198 it is often troublesome for 
universities, which primarily seek to facilitate a wide range of discussion on diverse and often 
controversial subjects. In extracurricular activities, like the one discussed in the above scenario, 
it would be difficult, at best, for a university to constitutionally limit access based on a speaker or 
subject-matter category since the purpose of the forum would be to encourage discussion on a 
widerange of current issues. Nevertheless, the functional dichotomy present in forum analysis 
will most likely favor a university's authority to place limits on access to the classroom. 
The question of access to the classroom is at the center of the intellectual diversity debate as 
supporters of this movement seek to mandate the inclusion of intellectual diversity in student 
course evaluations, grievance procedures and guidelines on teaching and program development. 
Such a move would, in practice, mandate access to a classroom for viewpoints otherwise 
excluded from this forum. n199 But unlike an extracurricular activity, a classroom and its related 
course are established for a precise and narrow purpose and constitute the very product provided 
by the university. As a result, a university would most likely be given wide latitude to control 
access to this forum, as such control would likely be regarded as a reasonable administrative or 
institutional function. n200 In his concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent, Justice John Paul Stevens 
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noted that universities routinely engage in a variety of content decisions in the execution of their 
learning and teaching missions: "They select books for inclusion in the library, they hire 
professors on the basis of their academic philosophies, they select courses for inclusion in the 
curriculum, and they reward scholars for what they have written." n201  [*349] As one 
commentator noted, such decisions are regularly based on view-point. For example, "Historians 
who deny the Holocaust are not likely to receive appointments to reputable departments, [and] 
students who deny the legitimacy of the taxing power of the federal government are not likely to 
receive high grades in law schools. n202 While both decisions would have the effect of 
discriminating against a particular viewpoint, such discrimination would most likely be deemed 
immaterial as long as it was legitimately related to the administrative function of the educational 
mission of the university. n203 
When it comes to legitimate pedagogical concerns and the subsequent implication of an 
educational institution's reputation and resources, the Court has noted that it is likely to defer to 
the judgment of academic administrators even in matters pertaining to the reasonable regulation 
of speech activities. n204 Such deference is due "the multitude of academic decisions that are 
made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions" because those decisions 
"require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the 
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."' n205 The Court's approach in the 
adjudication of legitimate pedagogical issues rests on a view of the academic marketplace as a 
communal and economic creation cabined by established professional conceptions of what 
constitutes the legitimate exchange of ideas. In this regard, the use of government property for 
activities encompassing legitimate pedagogical interests constitutes a nonpublic forum, where, 
for institutional purposes, university personnel are routinely called upon to make a variety of 
viewpoint discriminatory decisions. 
 
 [*350] UNIVERSITY CONTROL OF ACADEMIC SPEECH 
At the center of the debate over intellectual diversity mandates lies the question of the extent of 
control a university may constitutionally exert over the speech that resides in the academic 
marketplace. In Rosenberger, the Court reiterated the principle that "when the State is the 
speaker, it may make content-based choices." n206 This principle permits a university to 
"determine [] the content of the education it provides." n207 This principle also extends to 
government's role as a public employer and its ability to regulate the speech of its employees. 
Public employee speech doctrine is governed to a large extent by the balancing test set forth in 
Pickering v. Board of Education. n208 In Pickering, the Court recognized that the "State has 
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees." n209 The problem, the Court 
contended, is to "arrive at a balance between the interest of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." n210 
Building on Pickering, the Court in Connick v. Myers n211 instituted a two-part balancing test that 
denied a First Amendment cause of action to employees whose speech did not touch upon 
matters of public concern. n212 For those employees who spoke on matters of public concern, the 
Court determined whether, given the nature of the expression, the government had a reasonable 
justification for its disciplinary actions. n213 The Court noted that a government employer need 
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not allow disruption of the workplace and destruction of working relationships before taking 
action. n214 Under the balancing test, "[R]easonable predictions of disruption" n215 as well as basic 
interference with the "effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise," such as 
"[i]nterference with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker's job performance," constitute 
strong state interests. n216 Furthermore, predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on 
employee speech are consistently given a wide degree  [*351] of deference by the Court, 
especially when close working relationships are required to fulfill public responsibilities. n217 
While the Pickering-Connick test requires that courts balance the free speech interests of an 
employee speaking out as a citizen on matters of public concern against the government's interest 
in effectively and efficiently managing and administering the public services it provides through 
its employees, n218 it offers little guidance as to whether or how the test applies in circumstances 
where the government employee in the course of ordinary job duties speaks upon a matter of 
public concern. n219 In Garcetti v. Ceballos, n220 the Court answered that question when it held 
that public employees who make statements "pursuant to their official duties . . . are not speaking 
as citizens for First Amendment purposes." n221 In such circumstances, the "Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline." n222 The Court said its holding in 
Garcetti "simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created" and is consistent with the underlying principle that affords 
government employers "sufficient discretion to manage their operations," n223 despite the fact that 
it effectively isolates all speech which falls within the scope of an employee's job responsibilities 
from Constitutional scrutiny. n224 
The amount of control a university may exercise over the speech of its faculty was not 
specifically addressed in Garcetti. In fact, the Court noted it would not decide whether the 
Garcetti holding would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related to academic 
scholarship or classroom instruction n225 -- two areas where teachers speak and write on matters 
of public concern "pursuant to official duties" n226 and two areas of academic speech at issue in 
the intellectual diversity debate. In the realm of employee speech, academic speech presents a 
unique challenge. On the one hand, academic expression can be viewed as a "teacher's stock in 
trade, the commodity she sells to her employer in exchange for a salary." n227 This expression 
constitutes both the skill set for which public educational employers pay and the product that 
they  [*352] subsequently sell to incoming students. As such, it is inevitably a part of the 
teacher's official duties as well as the educational institution's intellectual enterprise. Under the 
employee speech doctrine, employers are entitled to control expression made pursuant to an 
employee's official duties. n228 Regulation of job-related speech is viewed as control over what an 
employer has commissioned or created itself. n229 The employee speech doctrine recognizes a 
university's interest in controlling classroom speech and maintaining adherence by its instructors 
to the subject matter of the courses they have been hired to teach. n230 Speech found to be 
unrelated or not germane to the subject matter of a particular course could constitutionally be 
restricted by the university. n231 As a result, the employee speech doctrine has been used to 
uphold the termination of a cosmetology instructor for distributing religious pamphlets on the 
sinfulness of homosexuality in a classroom setting, n232 the suspension of an English language 
and literature professor for using obscene and vulgar language in the classroom, n233 a prohibition 
on religious classroom speech by an assistant professor of exercise physiology, n234 the 
termination of an economics instructor for use of profane language in the classroom, n235 and the 
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termination of a nontenured assistant English professor for her choice of teaching methods and 
philosophy. n236 It has also been employed in the area of academic inquiry to uphold a restriction 
on Internet access of sexually-explicit research materials n237 and disciplinary action for the 
fabrication of data. n238 
 [*353] On the other hand, courts have recognized that the application of the employee speech 
doctrine to the academic marketplace requires an appreciation of the field of higher education 
and the role it plays in the advancement of knowledge and development of intellectual thought. 
n239 This recognition has resulted in the much-debated concept of academic freedom. n240 While 
the idea of academic freedom was first mentioned in a dissent by Justice William O. Douglas in 
Adler v. Board of Education, n241 it wasn't until Sweezy v. New Hampshire n242 that the concept 
was articulated by a plurality of the Court. 
At issue in Sweezy were the constitutional limits of the government's inquiry into the political 
beliefs and associations of its citizens. Part of the government's investigation focused on Paul 
Sweezy's guest lectures at the University of New Hampshire. When Sweezy refused to answer 
questions concerning his lecture, he was incarcerated for contempt, and the case ensued. n243 A 
plurality of four justices contended that the investigation was "an invasion of petitioner's liberties 
in the areas of academic freedom and political expression" -- two areas in which the "government 
should be extremely reticent to tread." n244 The significance of academic freedom in American 
universities is "almost self-evident," the justices wrote. n245 "To impose any strait jacket upon the 
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities" would stagnate the development of new 
discoveries. n246 Scholarship, they said, "cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust." n247 In this respect, "Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study 
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." n248 The concept of academic freedom 
was coupled with the guarantees of the First Amendment ten years later in Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents. n249 In Keyishian, the Court feared that  [*354] the vagueness of a New York statute, 
which disqualified from state employment "subversive" persons, might chill academic speech 
and inhibit scholarship. n250 "Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic 
freedom," n251 the Court wrote. "That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom." n252 
While Sweezy and Keyishian stand as the Court's landmark academic freedom cases, n253 the 
Court handed down several other cases decided during this time that touched upon that freedom. 
n254 In each case, the potential infringement on faculty interests came from McCarthy-era state 
statutes aimed at barring potential subversives from the faculties of public schools and 
universities. While some cases involved the disclosure of organizational memberships both past 
and present n255 and others involved state-imposed loyalty oaths or affidavits, n256 all could be 
said to involve restrictions on state employees rights as private citizens to speak and associate. 
n257 As such, all except one were declared unconstitutional. n258 Three were struck down under 
the doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness, n259 and two were deemed an arbitrary assertion of 
government power and thus a violation of due process of law. n260 Although the Court discussed 
or made reference to academic freedom in four of the six cases, academic freedom was not held 
to be dispositive in any of the  [*355] cases. Instead the concept was primarily used, as it was in 
Sweezy and Keyishian, to underscore the important place academic freedom holds within the far-
reaching constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and association. n261 
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The Court's "exuberant praise" of the value of academic freedom has made the legal reach of the 
right appear "soaring and expansive." n262 Not surprisingly, academic plaintiffs have been quick 
to assert that a constitutional protection of academic freedom insulates them against restrictions 
and disciplinary measures for academic speech. n263 But while many courts continue to pay 
homage to this "amorphous" n264 freedom, n265 the Supreme Court has never afforded academic 
instructors an exclusive First Amendment right under this concept. n266 To do so, courts have 
noted, would be to confer upon a limited class of individuals a special  [*356] constitutional right 
that would shield their communication from governmental and judicial oversight. n267 And yet, as 
one court observed, "To suggest that the First Amendment, as a matter of law, is never 
implicated when a professor speaks in class, is fantastic." n268 
Confusion over the term "academic freedom" stems from the Court's failure to fully define the 
concept or to at least denote whether the words have a meaning in legal contexts that are 
different from its usage in academe. In the academy, the term traditionally had been understood 
as a personal right of a faculty member against "ignorant" interference by university 
administrators and trustees. n269 In the Court's First Amendment parlance, however, the term has 
been understood as encompassing both individual and institutional freedom. n270 How the same 
right can protect both the professor and the university is unclear. n271 Courts, which have had to 
grapple with the inherent tension between these two components of academic freedom, n272 have 
noted that when both parties claim a constitutional right to academic freedom these "two 
freedoms are in conflict." n273 The resolution of the two freedoms is important because it 
determines the assignment of legal rights, which in turn determine the scope of choices available 
to each party and the degree to which each party is exposed to the choices of others. n274 It can be 
said that every assignment of rights "both increases and decreases freedom, though typically for 
different people." n275 The resolution of legal  [*357] conflict and the subsequent assignment of 
rights serves to channel externalities, that is, benefits and harms, in one way or the other 
depending on the values of those who have participated and prevailed in each stage of the legal 
struggle. n276 
Courts have recognized that both the individual and institution are implicated by the concept of 
academic freedom. However, when it comes to associating the concept with First Amendment 
guarantees, courts have largely regarded the concept as an "institutional right of selfgovernance 
in academic affairs." n277 This may be due, in part, to the development of the employee speech 
doctrine, which affords all government employees protection against dismissal and disciplinary 
action for the exercise of First Amendment rights. In 1968, when the Court first recognized the 
First Amendment speech rights of public employees, n278 it did so in a case involving a high 
school teacher who wrote a letter published in the local newspaper criticizing school officials for 
their handling of school revenue. In its resolution of the case, the Court defined two areas where 
the government's interest as an employer would be given priority over the academic speech of 
the teacher -- one, if the teacher's speech impeded the "proper performance of his daily duties in 
the classroom," or, two, if it interfered with "the regular operation" of the school. n279 
Subsequently, courts have concluded that the university may exercise extensive control over its 
educational enterprise. This control includes the power to promulgate rules and regulations, n280 
institute proper disciplinary action, n281 select and dismiss its faculty, n282 determine the content 
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 [*358] of curricular offerings n283 and accepted methods of instruction and class conduct, n284 
and regulate the placement of faculty artwork. n285 
But a university's control is not absolute. Under the employee speech doctrine, the line is drawn 
at speech that is "directed toward an issue of public concern" and where the interest in speaking 
outweighs the university's interest in regulating or restricting the speech. n286 Within the 
academic realm, "academic debates, pursuits, and inquiries" n287 as well as classroom instruction 
often fall within the "Supreme Court's broad conception of 'public concern,"' especially where 
the essence of the academic's role is to "prepare students for their place in society as responsible 
citizens" n288 or where the academic "'seeks to inform, edify, or entertain"' an audience through 
the discussion of "'ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery, opinions--scientific, political, or 
aesthetic."' n289 In cases where a faculty member is engaging in professional speech that is 
germane to the subject matter, the member's academic freedom will most likely outweigh the 
university's interest in regulating speech when no evidence exists to suggest the speech is having 
a negative impact upon the efficiency of the institution's operation. n290 To establish a negative 
impact, courts consider whether the faculty member's comments "meaningfully interfere" with 
the performance of the member's job duties or the university's general operations, undermine the 
legitimate educational goals or mission of the university, create disharmony or conflict or impair 
discipline among students and coworkers, or undermine the working relationship within a 
department. n291 The fact that the speech in question did not "actually disrupt the employer's 
operations" will not necessarily save it from constitutional restriction or regulation. n292 Under 
the employee speech doctrine, a "reasonable belief" that the speech at issue "would interfere with 
the employer's operations" may establish a countervailing government interest that would 
override the academic's free  [*359] speech interest. n293 The existence of "undifferentiated fear," 
n294 "apprehension of disturbance" n295 or the desire by the administration to avoid the 
"'discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany' a controversial subject" would, 
however, fall short of overcoming the free speech interest an academic in such a situation 
maintains. n296 
As Garcetti indicates n297 and commentators have noted, the "Court has never defined precisely 
the relationship between the protection of academic freedom and the regulation of public 
employee speech." n298 However, the Court noticeably signaled that the employee speech 
doctrine applies equally to academic and nonacademic plaintiffs when it vacated a decision by 
the Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a faculty member's First Amendment 
rights were violated when university officials instituted a disciplinary measure for anti-Semitic 
and racist remarks made during a public address off-campus. n299 Without comment on the First 
Amendment issue at stake in Jeffries v. Harleston, n300 the Court remanded the case to the court 
of appeals for further consideration in light of Waters v. Churchill, n301 a Supreme Court plurality 
decision involving the dismissal of a public employee for workplace speech in a nonacademic 
setting. n302 On reconsideration, the Second Circuit overturned its original decision and upheld 
the removal of Professor Leonard Jeffries Jr., from his position as department chair in retaliation 
for his remarks. n303 The vacated judgment suggests that the First Amendment rights claimed by 
academic employees do not extend any farther than the free speech rights afforded to all public 
employees speaking on matters of public concern. n304 The First Amendment is only implicated 
in  [*360] employee speech cases when the employee is speaking on a matter of public concern. 
Likewise, legal analysis of "what constitutes a matter of public concern and what raises academic 
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freedom concerns [are] of essentially the same character." n305 For both public concern and 
academic freedom, the "linchpin of the inquiry is . . . the extent to which the speech advances an 
idea transcending personal interest or opinion which impacts our social and/or political lives." 
n306 As a result, both academic and nonacademic plaintiffs seeking to establish that a 
government-initiated disciplinary action violated their free speech rights must demonstrate that 
the speech at issue both "involved a matter of public concern" n307 and was a "substantial or 
motivating factor" in the government's disciplinary action. n308 Correspondingly, academic 
defendants, like other governmental defendants seeking to escape liability for such an action, 
must demonstrate that regardless of the speech in question they would have instituted the same 
disciplinary measure n309 or that the employee's speech interfered or reasonably threatened to 
interfere n310 with the "effective and efficient fulfillment" of the government's responsibilities to 
the public. n311 
Taken together, academic freedom and the employee speech doctrine afford a university a great 
deal of power over the content of the education it provides. From curricular offerings to the 
selection and dismissal of faculty, courts have recognized and largely deferred to an institution's 
right of self-governance. n312 Deference is due given a university's duty to "serve its own interests 
as well as those if its professors" n313 and the fact that academic decisions require "expert 
evaluation of cumulative information." n314 Academic assessments, the Court has recognized, 
require "complex educational judgments" that "lie[] primarily within the expertise of the 
university." n315 As a result, courts are not to determine  [*361] "what is or is not germane to the 
ideas to be pursued in an institution of higher learning." n316 That is: 
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, . . . they 
should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override 
it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that 
the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. n317 
The intellectual diversity movement, which seeks to mandate guidelines on classroom content 
and program development as well as on the selection, tenure and promotion process, threatens to 
substantially erode an institution's academic freedom and loosen its control over the management 
and administration of its services. Movement advocates argue that a disproportionate percentage 
of left-leaning faculty members are pushing their values on students and colleagues and skewing 
the educational process. n318 Classroom speech, they contend, is ideologically slanted as 
professors frequently insert their political views into their courses, regardless of the subject 
matter taught. n319 Additionally, ideological intolerance has become institutionalized as 
evidenced by politically-sensitized curricular offerings, notably race, class, gender, sexuality and 
social justice studies; n320 extra-curricular programs designed to foster appreciation for multi-
cultural differences; n321 and diversity hiring initiatives. n322 In short, advocates argue that 
universities are pushing a politically correct agenda on students in the name of critical thinking. 
n323 Advocates point to specific courses and course descriptions listed in university catalogues as 
proof of this agenda. n324 Among the ideas proffered in such courses that advocates want 
countered are that "institutionalized racism exists;" n325 problems in income, racial, ethnic and 
gender inequality and heterosexism are natural outgrowths of the existing social structure; n326 
students should be sensitized to issues  [*362] facing multi-cultural groups; n327 U.S. "'culture 
covertly and overtly condones the abuse of women by their intimate partners;'" n328 and "'[p]oor 
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people and people of color comprise the majority of those imprisoned [in the U.S.] due to the 
war on drugs and racial and economic bias in policing and sentencing.'" n329 
Classroom speech, curricular offerings, extra-curricular programs, and hiring practices and 
initiatives represent the core of an institution's intellectual enterprise. These basic academic 
decisions have "'long been regarded as among the essential prerogatives and freedoms of the 
university administration.'" n330 Courts, which have been careful not insert themselves as "ersatz 
deans or educators," n331 have recognized time and again that intrusion into the management and 
administration of a university's intellectual enterprise runs counter to constitutional law, n332 and, 
as a result, have largely deferred to the judgment of the university in content-based disputes 
between a faculty member and the institution. n333 In disputes where a faculty member is acting 
as a course instructor, courts have noted that the educational judgment of an instructor can be 
questioned and redirected by the university. n334 The authority to question an instructor's 
educational judgment would also apply to conservative faculty members actively supported by 
intellectual diversity advocates. This authority could effectively nullify the impact such a hire 
would most likely have on substantive curricular changes and neutralize the attempt by the 
intellectual diversity movement to infuse the academy with alternative viewpoints. Moreover, the 
intrusion into a university's affairs supported by advocates backing legislative measures designed 
to promote intellectual diversity could easily be viewed  [*363] as interfering with the "effective 
and efficient" n335 fulfillment of educational process. Thus the question becomes to whom will 
the court defer in a legislative-administrative tug of war, where "government" is both the speaker 
and the regulator. 
 
UNIVERSITY INDEPENDENCE FROM LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT 
In 1982, the Seventh Circuit noted that 
Case law considering the standard to be applied where the issue is academic freedom of the 
university to be free of governmental interference, as opposed to academic freedom of the 
individual teacher to be free of restraints from the university administration, is surprisingly 
sparse. But what precedent there is at the Supreme Court level suggests that to prevail over 
academic freedom the interests of the government must be strong and the extent of intrusion 
carefully limited. n336 
 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the "university is a traditional 
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's 
ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of 
Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First 
Amendment." n337 While the Court's academic freedom and employee speech cases can be 
interpreted as providing the academy with an extensive degree of autonomy on matters of 
academic self-governance, n338 a constitutional challenge involving a legislative enactment 
mandating intellectual diversity would pit the university's interest in academic self-governance 
against a legislature's power to place conditions on the funding it provides to government 
programs. The First Amendment and academic freedom would be implicated should the 
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university attempt to establish that an intellectual diversity statute violated its constitutional right 
of free speech. 
While Justice Potter Stewart declared that the First Amendment does not confer upon state or 
federal institutions the same protection against  [*364] governmental interference it provides 
media organizations, n339 court decisions have largely "vindicated, rather than restricted, 
government's prerogative to speak and emphasized the importance of government's contributions 
to the marketplace of ideas." n340 The Supreme Court, in particular, has recognized that a 
university speaks when it "determines the content of the education it provides" n341 and that 
academic freedom is implicated when government attempts to "control or direct the content of 
the speech engaged in by the university or those affiliated with it." n342 Yet, the Court has also 
explained that government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program 
according to subjective criteria in order to encourage certain speech activities it believes to be in 
the public interest. n343 The freedom for government to engage in viewpoint-based speech-
selection choices materializes when government subsidizes the speech of others as a means of 
transmitting or promoting a message it favors. n344 In such circumstances, government is viewed 
as a speaker--not a regulator--and the consequences of legislative imprecision, ambiguity and 
subjectivity are seen as constitutionally insignificant even though a similar action by government 
in its regulator-role would raise substantial First Amendment concerns. n345 
The head-on collision between a university and its legislative funding source would present 
complicated First Amendment issues which have not been precisely defined by the Court n346 and 
implicate government's contradictory roles within the marketplace. In its traditional role as 
regulator, government is distrusted. Its participation in the speech market is primarily viewed as 
an attempt to monopolize debate by inhibiting, displacing or punishing competing ideas or 
information. As a result, government involvement in programs and forums set aside to encourage 
a diversity of views from private speakers is constitutionally suspect. Whether such involvement 
takes place through the subsidization of speech or the management of public property, 
viewpoint-based restrictions directed at these programs and forums are seen  [*365] as improper 
and held to strict judicial scrutiny. n347 Heightened constitutional scrutiny, however, is 
incompatible with certain roles government organizations and speakers perform. n348 The Court 
has noted that government-supported public television stations, libraries, arts organizations and 
family planning clinics must engage in content-based, speech-selection decisions. n349 First 
Amendment challenges to such decisions, whether from a private speaker or government-assisted 
organization, often turn on the function of the program in question and the role the government-
speaker performs in the dissemination of program-directed speech. 
As noted earlier, government enjoys broad discretion to make viewpoint-based choices when it 
speaks. n350 Broad discretion is also warranted when government's purpose in funding a program 
is to promote a specific message. In such instances, the legislature establishes a program to 
promote one idea over another, thus actively participating in the marketplace of ideas through the 
segregation of speech activities specifically tied to a government subsidy. n351 Through its 
funded-program, professionals are, in a sense, hired to convey government's message or to use 
their professional judgment to dispense funds to individual speakers based on the speaker's 
ability to convey the ideas supported by the program. n352 Individual program participants are, 
therefore, not coerced to disseminate the message, but are free to choose whether to participate in 
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the program, knowing the limitations on speech that arise from participation. n353 Individuals 
who choose to participate are viewed as disseminators of government ideas or scripted 
professional speech. Much like employee speech, program-participant speech is representational 
and does not necessarily reflect the individual's own expressive intentions. n354 Consequently, the 
legislative-funding source is given broad discretion to define the program's limits because, in the 
end, it is directly accountable to the electorate and the political process for the advocacy it funds. 
n355 
 [*366] Government also funds programs that fulfill traditional public information missions. 
Public libraries, for example, are established to facilitate "learning and cultural enrichment," n356 
public television stations are expected to air programming that serves the public interest, n357 and 
legal aid services provide legal advice in noncriminal matters to individuals who otherwise could 
not afford such assistance. n358 When a legislature funds a program intended to bring a diverse 
array of knowledge and information to the public, professionals are hired to manage the program 
and make the necessary editorial choices. n359 In such a program, the informational pool is 
usually so vast that pre-established legislative criteria for speech selection are, for the most part, 
unworkable. As a result, speech activities are not segregated according to the funding source, n360 
and government is not viewed as intending to convey or promote one idea over another through 
the establishment of the program. n361 Given that government is not seeking to participate in the 
marketplace, the legislative-funding source is not directly implicated by or held accountable for 
the speech selected. For example, the electorate does not assume that a legislature approved of 
every book in a public library or every program aired on public television. Moreover, in some 
instances, programs are established to advocate against the government interest. n362 As a result, 
program operators are often viewed as independent speech-selectors, who function largely free 
from governmental control. n363 The speech selected and ultimately disseminated by the program 
represents a professional judgment by the program's operators on the value of the speech activity 
to the public it serves. n364 Consequently, the program's operators are given broad discretion to 
use their professional editorial judgment to make content-based speech-selection decisions. n365 
A legislative measure mandating intellectual diversity would, in effect, require a university to 
actively incorporate conservative viewpoints into its program offerings. n366 Viewpoint-based 
legislation is held to strict scrutiny review if it is directed at a program set aside to encourage a 
 [*367] diversity of views from private speakers. n367 For the most part, universities do not 
function as open public forums. n368 Instead, they are designed, much like a public library, as a 
social good dedicated to facilitating learning and scholarship. The social utility of the nation's 
universities has repeatedly been recognized by the Court. Justices have touted the fundamental 
role universities play in the functioning of the nation and the continued development of its future 
leaders, n369 who gain "'new maturity and understanding'" n370 when widely exposed to the robust 
exchange of a multitude of ideas rather than to "'any kind of authoritative selection.'" n371 Laws, 
therefore, that obstruct the free and unconstrained exchange of ideas in this "traditional sphere of 
free expression" n372 or "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" are not constitutionally 
tolerated. n373 
The educational purpose of a university and the social utility it provides sets traditional 
university programs n374 apart from government-funded programs that promote one idea over 
another. Programs dedicated to teaching and scholarship bring vast amounts of information to 
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students, scholars and interested members of the public. Legislation that attempts to tie funding 
to a specific speech activity, such as classroom speech, for example, would be largely 
unworkable because universities also rely on tuition, philanthropic gifts and grant dollars to fund 
to such speech. Legislative-directed funding that cannot be specifically tied to the government-
mandated speech directive has, in some cases, failed a First Amendment challenge. n375 To 
overcome this potential constitutional barrier, a university would need to be able to limit the use 
of legislative funds for courses designed especially to promote intellectual diversity. n376 Since 
legislative funds don't cover the full cost of the education provided and curriculum offerings 
could not effectively be segregated into government-funded and university-funded, a university 
may be compelled to use its other funding sources to fund government-mandated speech. A lack 
of clarity regarding government's intention to  [*368] participate in the marketplace as a speaker 
through the distribution of public funds would result. 
A regulation that selectively funds a speech activity is not necessarily unconstitutional, however, 
just because government does not speak itself or subsidize the transmittal of a message it favors. 
n377 In United States v. American Library Association, n378 two government-funded programs 
designed to assist public libraries in acquiring Internet access were upheld against a First 
Amendment challenge n379 even though the legislature did not seek to communicate a specific 
message through the funding of the programs. n380 The programs, the Court explained, "were 
intended to help public libraries fulfill their traditional role of obtaining material of requisite and 
appropriate quality for educational and information purposes." n381 The fact that they required 
libraries to install software to block pornographic material in order to obtain the funding did not 
violate the First Amendment because "public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic 
material from their other collections." n382 Therefore, "Congress could reasonably impose a 
parallel limitation on its Internet assistance programs." n383 
A program's traditional role can also limit the power of the government to impose funding-based 
speech-selection restrictions. In Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, n384 the Court struck 
down as violative of the First Amendment a funding restriction that prohibited attorneys from 
representing clients in an "effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law." n385 The 
restriction, which was imposed by the Legal Services Corporation, an entity created by Congress 
to distribute government funds to local grantee organizations for the purpose of providing free 
legal assistance to indigent clients, n386 basically prevented an attorney representing an indigent 
client seeking welfare benefits from arguing that a "state statute conflicts with a federal statute or 
that either a state or federal statute by its terms or in its application" violates the Constitution. n387 
The Court concluded that the program was "designed to  [*369] facilitate private speech, not to 
promote a governmental message," given the fact that LSC-funded attorneys spoke on behalf of 
their clients and lawyers defending the decision to deny welfare benefits delivered the 
government's message. n388 The restriction, which effectively proscribed specific legal advice and 
assistance, in effect, distorted the traditional role of the participating attorneys and "prohibit [ed] 
speech necessary to the proper functioning" of the program. n389 
The proper functioning of the program at issue in Velazquez sets it apart from challenged 
programs in other subsidized speech cases. In Velazquez, the proper role of the grant recipients 
is to "advocate against the Government." n390 Thus an assumption is conveyed that LSC-funded 
attorneys are free of state control. n391 This assumption is not present with programs funding 
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public libraries, for example, or establishing Title X family planning clinics. n392 Such programs 
"have no comparable role that pits them against the Government." n393 Instead, the speech 
restricted in these programs lies outside the scope of the program established by government. n394 
In Velazquez, by contrast, the speech restricted fell within the scope of the program. The Court 
explained that while Congress was not required to fund the LSC program or, when funded, 
provide a whole range of litigation services, once the scope of the program was determined, 
Congress could not "exclude certain vital theories and ideas" included within that scope. n395 
Government regulations that seek to control an existing medium of expression in ways that 
distort its usual functioning often run afoul of the First Amendment. n396 When such regulations 
are challenged, the Court examines the medium's accepted usage to determine whether the 
particular restrictions on speech are "necessary for the program's purposes and limitations." n397 
The First Amendment, the Court has said, prohibits government from using a medium in "an 
unconventional way  [*370] to suppress speech inherent" in its nature. n398 Without a doubt, 
diversity of thought is inherent in the nature of the university. To foster intellectual diversity, 
universities recruit individuals who have been trained at competing and divergent institutions and 
whose area of expertise rounds out an academic department's curricular and scholarly products. 
They seek international perspectives and a diversified student and faculty body. And they 
develop an environment where ideas are challenged and refined through a process of peer 
review. The process of peer review works to assure that academic decisions are made 
"objectively on the basis of frank and unrestrained critiques and discussions" and plays a "vital 
role in the proper and efficient functioning" of a university's educational responsibilities. n399 It 
also helps to eradicate the inclusion of flawed concepts, theories, ideas and viewpoints from a 
university's curriculum and the scholarship it produces. Forced inclusion of specific perspectives 
and viewpoints runs counter to the nature of a university, and distorts the traditional role of 
higher education. As Justice Felix Frankfurter observed, a university must be free to "determine 
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and 
who may be admitted to study." n400 
Justice Frankfurter's observation, which has been, in effect, espoused in a number of Supreme 
Court opinions, n401 regards university actors as independent speech-selectors who function 
largely free from governmental control. The content selected and ultimately disseminated 
through curricular offerings and scholarly pursuits represents a professional judgment by the 
university's academicians on the value of the communication to the discipline it serves. 
Academicians, therefore, are not disseminators of government ideas or scripted professional 
speech. They function as instructors and scholars whose proper role may well include the 
evaluation of government administrations, policies and actions. Such evaluations may also lead 
an academic to openly challenge or advocate against a defined governmental interest or program. 
As a result, a court would most likely defer to a university's professional editorial judgment in 
making content-based speech-selection decisions. Legislative regulations that would arguably 
mandate the inclusion of  [*371] conservative viewpoints n402 would; therefore, most likely 
conflict with the First Amendment even though diversity of thought, like the exclusion of 
pornographic material from public libraries, is necessary to the proper functioning of a 
university. A legislative-directive that given the present academic environment would effectively 
require the inclusion of conservative viewpoints is closely analogous to Congress mandating the 
exclusion of specific theories and ideas from welfare litigation and should be viewed as such by 
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the Court. Universities are not designed to foster wide-open diversity of thought in a manner 
analogous to the public square. Instead, they are established to foster and disseminate academic 
truths. n403 The central problem, therefore, with the intellectual diversity pursuit is its penchant 
for the inclusion of alternative viewpoints within the body of knowledge provided by a university 
regardless of whether those viewpoints have academic validity. To mandate such an inclusion is 
to influence the selection of speech that constitutes the inherent nature of the university and lies 
squarely within the scope of its control. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The exclusion of ideas from what the Court has termed a "traditional sphere of free expression" 
n404 has led to a call by the intellectual diversity movement for government intervention in the 
academic marketplace. At the end of the day, intellectual diversity advocates would like to see 
the inclusion of conservative ideas and points of view reflected in course curriculum and 
classroom discussion. They also support hiring and tenure policies that increase the 
representation of conservative faculty members in the nation's universities. The insertion of 
conservative ideas into academic discourse would, in their opinion, strengthen the education 
American universities provide by increasing the diversity of viewpoints to which students are 
exposed. n405 This contention, then, is based on the premise that a multiplicity of viewpoints is as 
beneficial to the classroom as it is to society. But the academic marketplace is not analogous to 
the open marketplace of ideas. It is erroneous to conclude that a university functions like an open 
marketplace actively engaged in the free and  [*372] robust exchange of ideas. In such a 
marketplace, all ideas are valued given their ability to produce conflict and contradiction and 
provoke vehement and, at times, caustic debate. In the long run, truth is expected to emerge, but 
in the short run, harmful ideas and faulty propositions may rule the day. This short run prospect, 
however, is not conducive to the primary function of a university, which is "'to discover and 
disseminate knowledge by means of teaching and research.'" n406 While this function supports a 
university's commitment to the rational and disciplined pursuit of truth and the intellectual 
development of its students, it also constrains the production and consumption of ideas present in 
the academic marketplace. It is illogical, then, to assess the value and effectiveness of academic 
discourse by its ability to produce a multiplicity of views and perspectives. While intellectual 
diversity is valued in the academic marketplace, it is valued only to a point. Consequently, ideas 
that conflict with the established collective judgment and critical perspective of a discipline are 
most often excluded from academic debate and classroom discussion. 
First Amendment case law, which has often perpetuated the view of an academic marketplace as 
widely diverse, n407 has also given university administrators extensive control when it comes to 
granting access to or restricting expression occurring within a nonpublic forum established for 
managerial or institutional purposes. n408 For example, at many institutions, course content 
decisions are subjected to institutional oversight by curriculum committees in an effort to ensure 
that course offerings fit within the university's programmatic goals and educational mission. n409 
Viewpoint-based decisions regarding the conception and development of an institution's course 
offerings as well as the composition and teaching assignments of its faculty would most likely be 
given deferential treatment by the courts, considering the central function these components play 
in the overall administration of the university. 
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The First Amendment also affords a university a substantial amount of control over the speech 
that takes place within classrooms. While faculty members are given a wide latitude to engage in 
professional classroom speech that is germane to the course topic and may employ  [*373] 
innovative teaching methods which can be demonstrated as beneficial to the learning process, the 
university retains disciplinary control over classroom tactics and speech that interferes or 
reasonably threatens to interfere with the effective and efficient fulfillment of the educational 
process. n410 In short, the judgment of an instructor can be questioned and redirected by the 
university regardless of the instructor's political or professional leanings. University 
administrators who, for example, view the mission of higher education as fostering the 
advancement of a tolerant society and politically correct mindset may likely question the 
pedagogical judgment of faculty members who do not share this view, especially if that 
judgment is reflected in class discussions and assignments. Accordingly, even though intellectual 
diversity advocates secure positions on the faculty of universities, there is no guarantee their 
viewpoints will infiltrate the curriculum. 
Because academic assessments require "complex educational judgments" that "lie [] primarily 
within the expertise of the university," n411 courts have recognized and largely deferred to an 
institution's right of self-governance. n412 Legislation which requires the production of an annual 
report outlining measures a university has implemented to infuse alternative viewpoints into 
classroom discussion and the academic mindset, would substantially erode an institution's 
administrative authority to effectively manage its intellectual enterprise. Such an enactment 
would, at present, amount to a government-mandated inclusion of conservative viewpoints into 
the curriculum and scholarship a university produces, and present complex First Amendment 
issues that could ultimately pit a university interest in academic self-governance against a 
legislature's power to place conditions on the funding it provides to government programs. 
Because the legislation so squarely impacts the managerial function of the education mission of 
the university, it would most likely run afoul of the First Amendment. 
As with access and employee speech issues, the First Amendment provides added free speech 
protection for a university when the institution is attempting to secure the effective and efficient 
operation of its enterprise. A university, then, is in a stronger First Amendment position when 
exerting its right to engage in or restrict speech necessary for the proper functioning of its 
educational enterprise. In such a position, university administrators would most likely be viewed 
as  [*374] independent speech-selectors, n413 analogous to public broadcasters who "retain the 
right to use [their] editorial judgment to exclude certain speech" n414 in order to effectively 
operate the television station and disseminate the broadcast message. n415 To conclude otherwise 
would allow legislative control of a medium in ways that would distort its usual functioning. n416 
The dynamics of a university system, like the dynamics of a broadcast system, give 
administrators the right to use their professional judgment to exclude certain ideas and 
viewpoints from the institution's educational message so that the education students receive is 
more effectively delivered. n417 
A university simply could not fulfill its educational mission if the content of its programs was 
restricted or regulated through some government-funding mechanism. A university does not 
speak for its legislative funding source and cannot achieve its objectives if mandated to espouse 
a government-approved message. Subsequently, it must operate largely free from government 
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control to meet its educational goals and satisfy its public interest purpose. As with other 
independently operated public institutions, not every decision, course offering or faculty hire will 
meet with unanimous or even over-whelming public approval. But, like the greater marketplace, 
the academic marketplace is perpetually in a state of flux in its quest for the truth. Courses 
intellectual diversity advocates often complain about, such as race, class, gender and sexuality 
classes, n418 are a part of this self-correcting evolution n419 as are present-day centers devoted to 
the study of Western civilization, America's founding and free market economics. n420 
 [*375] While the academic marketplace is largely averse to securing uninhibited debate on 
public issues and providing low barriers to entry, it is susceptible to general shifts in political and 
public attitudes. The Social and Political Views of American Professors, a recent study by two 
sociologists, found that younger faculty members have moved decidedly to the center. n421 
Professors aged 26-35 account for the highest percentage of moderates and the lowest percentage 
of liberals and conservatives and "provide further support for the idea that in recent years the 
trend has been toward increasing moderatism." n422 By contrast, "Self-described liberals" are 
most prevalent among professors aged 50-64, "who were teenagers or young adults in the 1960s" 
while faculty members aged 65 and older comprise the largest number of conservatives on 
campus. n423 The study also found that the most liberal professors on issues of sex and gender 
were the youngest (26-35) followed by faculty members aged 50-64. n424 This holds true for the 
public at large. A recent Pew Research Center study showed "declining support for traditional or 
conservative social values, in such areas as homosexuality and the role of women in society," 
regardless of political party affiliation. n425 Since 1987, Republicans, Democrats and 
independents all have become substantially less conservative on social values. n426 The decline in 
social conservatism, the study concluded, is being hastened by changed generational attitudes, 
"as each new age cohort has come into adulthood with less conservative views on [these] 
questions than did their predecessors." n427 It is very likely, then, that this shift in public attitudes 
would also be reflected in studies focusing on the academy. n428 
The liberal indoctrination of today's college student is difficult at best to pin on university 
professors. A Pew Research Center study on Gen Nexters (18-25) found that while this 
generation is the "most tolerant" of any on "social issues, such as immigration, race and 
homosexuality," n429 its members also maintain extremely close contact with their  [*376] parents 
and family, identify "getting rich" as one of their life's top goals, largely reject the notion that 
government is inefficient and wasteful, and are more likely than other generations to support the 
privatization of Social Security. n430 In short, "[T]heir views defy easy categorization," n431 as do 
the views of university faculty members and administrators. For example, much of the 
contention that university professors are over-whelmingly liberal comes from voter registration 
and voting patterns studies. n432 Commentators have pointed out that this type of research is very 
misleading because it equates Democratic identification with liberalism and fails to account for 
ideological shifts in party politics. n433 These commentators conclude that party affiliation studies 
"may say less about the political orientation of faculty and more about the growing conservatism 
of the Republican Party." n434 Academics, then, may look more liberal to Republicans -- not 
because the political orientation of the faculty have moved to the left, but rather that the 
Republican Party has moved significantly farther to the right. n435 
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In the end, public universities were created to provide an expertise that government simply does 
not possess. That expertise, while benefiting society in numerous ways, n436 has been and will 
continue to be used by faculty members -- liberal, centrist and conservative -- in ways that those 
with other political orientations might not like. n437 To mandate the inclusion of a certain political 
orientation or point of view in order to appease outside interests runs counter to the educational 
mission of a university and defies First Amendment jurisprudence. First Amendment case law 
surrounding this issue clearly gives administrators a wide degree of authority over the operation 
of the university. That authority includes the right to determine curricular content and the 
professional make up of the faculty. For administrators to back away from exerting this authority 
is to indicate that they do not believe in the academic judgments of their faculty and the benefits 
to society a college education produces. From individual economic benefits that translate into 
lower unemployment and poverty rates to healthier lifestyles and increased levels of 
volunteerism and voter participation, obtaining a  [*377] college education is good for society. 
n438 But perhaps the greatest benefit to society is in the overwhelming importance college 
graduates place on trying to understand the opinions of others. n439 So rather than indoctrinating 
U.S. college students to think one way, research indicates that a college education actually opens 
one's mind to the differing opinions of others. 
Given all that American universities contribute to the formation of a tolerant civic society, the 
challenge the intellectual diversity movement poses to the goals of higher education should be 
openly contested. But such a challenge cannot be seriously combated if higher education is 
viewed as an extension of the Holmesian notion of the marketplace of ideas. The presupposition 
of such a marketplace is that each participant is possessed of the full capacity for individual 
choice. n440 This is simply not the case in the academic marketplace. Universities, therefore, need 
to demonstrate that the nonpublic forum created by government for the attainment of an educated 
citizenry is governed by professional academics who base institutional content and hiring 
decisions on a transparent process founded on established peer-review standards and the 
collective judgment of faculty and administrators. 
In the end, the resolution of this issue will ultimately result in the enhancement of rights for some 
and the diminishment of rights for others. Speech activities within the academic marketplace, 
then, will decidedly favor the values of those who have prevailed in this struggle. If, as this 
article concludes, the resolution favors the academy, the degree to which faculty, students and 
others are subjected to the choices of administrators and administrative committees would 
increase as the rights of these groups decrease. On the other hand, if intellectual diversity 
advocates are successful in pushing forth legislation that requires mechanisms for the 
enhancement of conservative viewpoints, university actors as well as students would be 
subjected to the choices and values of these outside actors. Regardless of the outcome, students 
appear to have the least amount of freedom in the academic marketplace, and are the most 
vulnerable to the choices of others. It is, therefore, incumbent upon legislators, administrators 
and others making administrative decisions to use their authority responsibly. Academic content 
decisions must be based on sound educational principles, which are clearly articulated so that 
students are fully aware of the choices and values to  [*378] which they will be exposed. Given 
the unique position within the ideas market, courts have placed higher education and the fact that 
every assignment of free speech rights for some produces a chilling effect for others, legislators, 
advocates and university actors should eschew any desirability to diminish a student's capacity to 
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reason and communicate. Such desirability runs counter to the distinct purpose of higher 
education, which ideally functions to enhance rational thought and discussion and, thereby, 
sustains the very abilities that form the foundation of First Amendment freedom. n441 
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journalistic discretion")); federal workplace charity drive (Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 
809 (1985) (upholding the regulation as a reasonable means of "avoiding controversy that may 
disrupt the workplace" and adversely affect the success of the campaign)); internal mail system 
(Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 52 (1983) (upholding the 
regulation as a "means of insuring labor peace" within a public school district)); military base 
(Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding the regulation as way to maintain "loyalty, 
discipline, [and] morale")); advertising space on a public transit system (Ridley v. Massachusetts 
Bay Transportation Authority, 390 F.3d 65, 93 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding a regulation as a 
means of "maximizing revenue" while "not reducing ridership through offensive 
advertisements")); mail delivery system (Chiu v. Plano Independent Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 
356 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a regulation as a reasonable attempt to provide information 
relating to programs or services for students)); advertising space on a high school's baseball field 
(Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958,966-67 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(uphold a regulation as a reasonable means to raise revenue while avoiding potential controversy 
or disruption)). 
n191  See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682-83 (finding that the restriction was based on facially neutral 
criteria); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 812 (finding that the justifications for the restriction were 
facially neutral); Perry, 460 U.S. at 49 (finding no intent to favor one viewpoint over another); 
Greer, 424 U.S. at 839 (1976) (finding that the policy has been "objectively and evenhandedly 
applied"); Ridley, 390 F.3d at 91 (finding that the regulation was "not intended to give one side 
an advantage over another" and was evenhandedly applied to "all advertisers on all sides of all 
questions"); Chiu, 260 F.3d at 356 (finding that the "subject matter of flyer ... is not of a similar 
character to any previous use of school mail delivery system"); Diloreto, 196 F.3d at 968 
(finding nothing in the record that indicated the forum had been open to the subject of religion). 
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n192  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 10-3-04, 120 (2001) (rejecting as 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination the exclusion of all groups which are religious in nature 
from a secular educational forum); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 825, 831-32 (1995) (finding viewpoint discrimination even though guidelines exclude 
an entire category of religious activity without reference to religious viewpoint); Lamb's Chapel 
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (finding that the regulation 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination even though it "had been, and would be, applied in the same 
way to all uses of school property for religious purpose"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
269-70 (1981) (finding that government must satisfy strict scrutiny review to justify its exclusion 
of a student group from a forum generally open for use by student groups); Hills v. Scottsdale 
Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1051-53 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the exclusion of any 
material of a religious nature from a distribution system constitutes viewpoint discrimination). 
n193  See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108 (involving a limited public forum that was open to 
"activities that serve a variety of purposes, including events 'pertaining to the welfare of the 
community"'); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 824 (involving a student activities fund established by 
the university to "support a broad range of extracurricular student activities that 'are related to the 
educational purpose of the University"'); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (involving the use of 
school property for "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses 
pertaining to the welfare of the community"); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264 (involving state 
university facilities "generally available for activities of registered student groups"); Hills, 329 
F.3d at 1047 (involving a policy and practice of distributing or displaying of brochures and other 
promotional literature as a "'community service' for parents and children"). 
n194  See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
n195  See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94. 
n196  See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 166 (1996). 
n197  Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S 828, 840 (1976). 
n198  Id. at 839. This line of reasoning was most recently applied in Sussman v. Crawford, 488 
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). In Sussman, plaintiffs sought to compel the U.S. Military Academy at 
West Point to allow a demonstration by approximately 1,000 protestors during a graduation 
ceremony at which Vice President Richard Cheney was delivering a commencement address. Id. 
at 138. The court said the restriction was constitutional because it was evenhandedly applied to 
all groups of protestors. Id. at 140-41. 
n199  The use of the word "classroom" refers to a specific course offered by a university at a 
particular time, date and place. 
n200  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981); Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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n201  Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
n202  Post, supra note 196, at 166. 
n203  Id. at 167. 
n204  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (noting the Court's tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions); Univ. of Pa. v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) (noting the "importance of avoiding second-
guessing of legitimate academic judgments"); Hazelwood v. Kuhlemeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 
(1988) (holding that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so 
long s their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"); Univ. of Mich. 
Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (noting that the Court is reluctant to "trench on the 
prerogatives of state and local educational institutions."); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. 
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that "University faculties 
must have the widest range of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of 
students and their entitlement to promotion or graduation"). 
n205  Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90) 
n206  515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
n207  Id. 
n208  391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
n209  Id. at 568. 
n210  Id. 
n211  461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
n212  Id. at 147. 
n213  Id. at 150. 
n214  Id. at 152. 
n215  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion) 
n216  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). 
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n217  See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673; Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. 
n218  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 150; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
n219  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1973 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
n220  126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). 
n221  Id. at 1960. 
n222  Id. 
n223  Id. 
n224  Id. at 1965 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
n225  Id. at 1962. 
n226  Id. at 1960. 
n227  Mayer v. Monroe County Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 2007). 
n228  Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. 
n229  Id. 
n230  See Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006). See also Pickering 
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (noting that a school district's interest as an 
employer would be given priority if a teacher's speech impeded the "proper performance of his 
daily duties in the classroom" or interfered with "the regular operation" of the school) 
n231  See Piggee, 464 F.3d at 672; Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 821 (6th Cir. 
2001); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1991). 
n232  See Piggee, 464 F.3d at 671-72. 
n233  See Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 820-21, 823-24. 
n234  See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1077. 
n235  See Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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n236  See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1973). 
n237  See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
n238  See Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Illinois, 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004). Although 
not the specific focus of this article, courts have also used the employee speech doctrine to 
uphold the dismissal of a vice president for criticizing potentially illegal or unethical behaviors 
of college officials (see Vila v. Padron, 484 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2007)); the termination of 
men's head basketball coach for post-game comments (see Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 
1063 (8th Cir. 2006)); disciplinary action for anti-Semitic and racist remarks made by a professor 
in a public address (see Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1995)); termination of men's 
head basketball coach for racist remarks made in the locker room (see Dambrot v. Cent. 
Michigan Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1191 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
n239  See Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2006); Bonnell v. 
Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 822-23 (6th Cir. 2001); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075. See also Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957). 
n240  See, e.g., Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410-15. 
n241  342 U.S. 485 (1952). In his dissent, Douglas argued that the "very threat" that a teacher 
may be called upon to defend past memberships and associations "is certain to raise havoc with 
academic freedom." Id. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
n242  354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
n243  Id. at 243-44. 
n244  Id. at 250. 
n245  Id. 
n246  Id. 
n247  Id. 
n248  Id. 
n249  385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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n250  Id. at 603-04. 
n251  Id. at 603. 
n252  Id 
n253  See Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries v. Harleston II, 
J.C. & U.L. 217, 224 (1995). 
n254  See Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 
(1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 
(1959); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 34 U.S. 
183 (1952). 
n255  See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 480; Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 114; Slochower, 350 U.S. at 553. 
n256  See Whitehill, 389 U.S. at 55; Baggett, 377 U.S. at 361; Wieman, 34 U.S. at 184. 
n257  See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287 (1984) (noting that 
cases, such as Keyishian, Shelton and Sweezy, "involved individuals' rights to express their 
views and to associate with others for communicative purposes");Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 
401, 413 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that "several other cases decided at roughly the same time as 
Sweezy involved restrictions on state employees' rights as private citizens to speak and 
associate"). 
n258  In Barenblatt, a five-member majority upheld a college teacher's conviction for refusing to 
answer questions before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-America Activities as 
to his membership in and affiliation with the Communist Party. 360 U.S. at 113. The Court found 
that, unlike in Sweezy, Congress did not exceed its authority to investigate Communist activity 
in the field of education. Id. at 129, 133. Such an investigation was related to the right of self-
preservation and was not directed at controlling what is being taught. Id. at 128, 130. 
n259  Whitehill, 389 U.S. at 62; Baggett, 377 U.S. at 369, 371; Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490. 
n260  Slochower, 350 U.S. at 559; Wieman, 34 U.S. at 191. 
n261  See Whitehill, 389 U.S. at 59-60 (recognizing that laws which abridge the First 
Amendment rights of teachers are "hostile to academic freedom"); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 487 (1960) (contending that the "vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools"); Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 112 (noting that 
the areas of academic teaching and learning exist within a "constitutionally protected domain"). 
Furthermore, citing Wieman, Sweezy, Shelton and Keyishian, the Court concluded in 2003 that 
it has "long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive 
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy 
a special niche in our constitutional tradition." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
Note, in Baggett, the Court only briefly mentioned the concept when it noted that the academic 
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freedom interests of students are protected by a "judgment in favor of the teaching personnel." 
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 n.5 (1964). 
n262  Byrne, supra note 102, at 291. 
n263  See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 821 (6th Cir. 2001); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 
401, 409 (4th Cir. 2000); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F. 2d 583, 584 (6th Cir. 1986); Hetrick v. 
Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1973). 
n264  Hetrick, 480 F.2d at 709. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 
1982) (noting that the "precise contours of the concept of academic freedom are difficult to 
define"). 
n265  See, e.g., Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001) (contending 
that the "argument that teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the 
government can censor teacher speech without restriction, is totally unpersuasive"); Bonnell, 241 
F.3d at 823 (noting that a "professor's rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are 
paramount in the academic setting"); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(noting that the court is "mindful of the invaluable role academic freedom play in our public 
schools, particularly at the post-secondary level"); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 
F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (contending that the First Amendment's protection of academic 
freedom extends into the classroom) 
n266  See Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 288 (1984) (noting that 
no constitutional right exists for faculty to participate in institutional policymaking even when 
"assuming that speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment take on a special meaning in an 
academic setting"); Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 414 (noting that the Supreme Court has "never 
recognized that professors possess a First Amendment right of academic freedom to determine 
for themselves the content of their courses and scholarship, despite opportunities to do so"); 
Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075 (noting that no support exists to "conclude that academic freedom is an 
independent First Amendment right"). 
n267  See Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 824; Urofsky, 216 F.2d at 411 n.13; Hetrick, 480 F.2d at 709. 
n268  Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1013-14 (W.D. Va. 1996). 
n269  Byrne, supra note 102, at 279, 292. 
n270  The Court has recognized that academic freedom thrives on both the "independent and 
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students" and the "autonomous 
decisionmaking by the academy." Univ. of Mich. Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 
(1985). 
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n271  See Byrne, supra note 102, at 257. 
n272  See Rabban, Functional Analysis, supra note 58, at 230. 
n273  Piarowski, v. Prairie State Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985). See also Bonnell v. 
Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 823 (6th Cir. 2001); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989). 
Commentators have also acknowledged this problem. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 102, at 257; 
Elizabeth Mertz, The Burden of Proof and Academic Freedom: Protection for Institution or 
Individual?, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 492, 493 (1988); Stacy E. Smith, Who Owns Academic 
Freedom?: The Standard for Academic Free Speech at Public Universities, 59 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 299, 313 (2001). 
n274  See Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the Rise 
of the Bottleneck "Rule" in the Turner Decisions, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 37 (2003). 
n275  Warren J. Samuels, Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J.L. & 
ECON. 435, 441 (1972). 
n276  See Whitmore, supra note 274, at 38. 
n277  Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.2d 401, 412 (4th Cir. 2000). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003) (holding a law school has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse 
student body based on a First Amendment protection of educational autonomy); Univ. of 
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion) (noting that while 
academic freedom is not "a specifically enumerated constitutional right," it is a "special concern 
of the First Amendment," which encompasses the "freedom of a university to make its own 
judgments" regarding the education it provides). 
n278  See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Hiers, supra note 253, at 218; 
Smith, supra note 273, at 326. 
n279  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73. 
n280  See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972) (quoting Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 
415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969)). 
n281  See id. 
n282  See Univ. of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n., 493 U.S. 182, 198 
(1990); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989); Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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n283  See Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2006); Bishop v. Aronov, 
926 F.2d 1066, 1076-77 (11th Cir. 1991). 
n284  See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995); Parate, 868 F.2d at 
827; Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1986); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 
709 (6th Cir. 1973). 
n285  See Piarowski v. Prairie State Coll., 759 F.2d 625, 632-33 (7th Cir.1985). 
n286  Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll. and Kentucky Cmty. and Technical Sys., 260 F.3d 671, 
678 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. 5631, 568 (1968) 
n287  Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2003). 
n288  Hardy, 260 F.2d. at 679. 
n289  Trejo, 319 F.3d at 884 (quoting Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
n290  See Hardy, 260 F.3d at 679, 681. 
n291  Id. at 680-81. 
n292  Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereafter Jeffries II]. 
n293  Id. 
n294  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1968). See also Hardy, 
260 F.3d. at 682; Burnham v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 679 (8th Cir. 1997) (en bane) 
n295  Id. 
n296  Hardy, 260 F.3d. at 682 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). 
n297  See supra text accompanying note 225. 
n298  Smith, supra note 273, at 336. See Alisa W Chang, Resuscitating the Constitutional 
"Theory" of Academic Freedom: A Search For a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 915, 919 (2001); Karen C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech 
and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2-3 (2001); Hiers, supra note 253, at 218. 
n299  See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1995). 
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n300  21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereafter Jeffries I]. 
n301  511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality). 
n302  Id. at 664. 
n303  Jeffries II, 52 F.3d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1995). 
n304  In Urofsky v. Gilmore, the court of appeals indicated that the "academic freedom of an 
individual professor" has been subsumed by the "protection against dismissal for the exercise of 
First Amendment rights" provided under the employee speech doctrine. 216 F.3d 401, 415 (4th 
Cir. 2000). 
n305  Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1188 (6th Cir. 1995). 
n306  Id. 
n307  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1245 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
n308  Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). See also 
Jeffries I, 21 F.3d 1238, 1245 (2d Cir. 1994). 
n309  See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 286. See also Jeffries I, 21 F.3d at 1246. 
n310  See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Waters v. Churchill, 
511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion). 
n311  Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. See also Jeffries I, 21 F.3d at 1246. 
n312  See supra text accompanying notes 204-05, 228-38, 277-85. 
n313  Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). 
n314  Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). 
n315  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). See also Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that 
academic assessments are best performed through a process of peer review). 
n316  Univ. of Wisconsin Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000). 
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n317  Univ. of Michigan Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985). 
n318  See Zipp & Fenwick, supra note 7, at 305. 
n319  See Intellectual Diversity, supra note 15, at 6. 
n320  See Ward Churchills, supra note 107, at 5-25. 
n321  See id. at 31. 
n322  See id. at 30-31. 
n323  See id. at 3; Intellectual Diversity, supra note 15, at 3. 
n324  See Ward Churchills, supra note 107, at 5-25. 
n325  Id. at 5. 
n326  Id. at 5-6. 
n327  Id. at 10. 
n328  Id. at 14 (quoting a course on "Domestic Violence" offered by Vassar College). 
n329  Id. at 18 (quoting an introductory seminar in African-American and Africana Diaspora 
Studies offered at Williams College). 
n330  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 
336 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1983) (concurring 
opinion)) 
n331  Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991). See also Univ. of Michigan 
Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826-27 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
n332  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003); Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 
n.12; Univ. of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion); 
Urokfsy v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 414 (4th Cir. 2000); Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1075; Notre Dame 
Du Lac, 715 F.2d at 336. 
n333  See supra text accompanying notes 228-38, 277-85, 312-17. 
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n334  See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1076-77. See also Piggee v. Carl Sandburg Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 
671 (7th Cir. 2006); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 820 (6th Cir. 2001); Parate, 868 F.2d at 
827; Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1973). 
n335  Connick, 461 U.S. at 150. 
n336  Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604-05 
(1967)). 
n337  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, 605-06). 
n338  See supra text accompanying notes 277-334 
n339  Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139 & n.7 (Stewart, 
J., concurring). 
n340  David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 1637, 
1643 (2006). 
n341  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995). 
n342  Univ. of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 493 U.S. 182, 197 
(1990). 
n343  See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998); Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). 
n344  See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001); Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 834; Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. 
n345  See Finley, 514 U.S. at 588-90. 
n346  See Univ. of Pennsylvania, 515 U.S. at 198 n.6. 
n347  See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834. 
n348  See United States v. American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality 
opinion); Finley, 524 U.S. at 585; Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 
672-73 (1998). 
 
 
 
55 
 
n349  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 204-05; Finley, 524 U.S. at 585; Forbes, 523 
U.S. at 673-74; Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94. 
n350  See supra text accompanying notes 206-24. 
n351  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 211-12; Finley, 524 U.S. at 573-77, 585; Rust, 
500 U.S. at 177, 193-94, 196. 
n352  See Finley, 524 U.S. at 572; Rust, 500 U.S. at 196, 199. 
n353  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 212; Rust, 500 U.S. at 199. 
n354  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198-99. 
n355  See Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001); Rust, 500 U.S. at 194. 
n356  American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 203. 
n357  See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
n358  See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536. 
n359  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 204-05; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673-74. 
n360  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
n361  See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542-43; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673-74. 
n362  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 213. 
n363  See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542; Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673-74. 
n364  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 204; Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542-45. 
n365  See American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 204-05; Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 548; Forbes, 523 
U.S. at 673-74. 
n366  See supra text accompanying notes 107-09, 318-29. 
n367  See supra text accompanying notes 190-95. 
 
 
 
56 
 
n368  See supra text accompanying notes 196-205. 
n369  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
n370  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250). 
n371  Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
n372  Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
n373  Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
n374  These programs involve both teaching and scholarship and are at the center of the 
intellectual diversity debate. 
n375  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 399-401 
(1984). 
n376  See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
n377  See United States v. American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194, 213 n.7 (2003) (plurality 
opinion). 
n378  539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
n379  Id. at 199, 214. 
n380  Id. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
n381  Id. at 211. 
n382  Id. at 212. 
n383  Id. 
n384  531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
n385  Id. at 536-37. 
n386  Id. at 536. 
 
 
 
57 
 
n387  Id. at 537. 
n388  Id. at 542. 
n389  Id. at 544. 
n390  United States v. American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. 194, 213 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis in original). 
n391  Id. 
n392  See id.; Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541. 
n393  American Library Ass'n., 539 U.S. at 213. 
n394  See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 541. 
n395  Id. at 548. For example, the Legal Services Corporation Act proscribed the use of funds in 
criminal proceedings, litigation involving nontherapeutic abortions, secondary school 
desegregation, military desertion or violations of the Selective Service statute. Id. at 537. An 
LSC-funded attorney would be prohibited from representing a client in litigation falling within 
these proscribed areas. 
n396  See id. at 543. 
n397  Id. 
n398  Id. 
n399  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 
336 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Martin v. Helstad, 699 F.2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1983) (concurring 
opinion). 
n400  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
n401  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003); Univ. of Michigan Regents v. 
Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26, n.11-12 (1985); Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 
435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); Univ. of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 
 
 
58 
 
n402  See supra text accompanying notes 320-29 for a sample of the viewpoints intellectual 
diversity advocates find troubling and point to as evidence of a left-leaning ideological slant that 
professors are using to push their political agendas on students. 
n403  See supra text accompanying notes 57-73, 102-106. 
n404  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 
589, 603 (1967)). 
n405  See Intellectual Diversity, supra note 15, at 4. 
n406  Post, supra note 64, at 322 (quoting Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at 
Yale, 4 HUM. RTS. 357, 357 (1975)). 
n407  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); Univ. of Wisconsin Regents v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 231-33 (2000); Rust, 500 U.S. at 200; Univ. of California Regents v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603. 
n408  See supra text accompanying notes 190-205. 
n409  See Freedom in the Classroom, AM. ASS'N. OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, Sept.-Oct. 2007, 
at 56, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/A/class.htm. 
n410  See supra text accompanying notes 277-311. 
n411  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2002). 
n412  See supra text accompanying notes 312-17. 
n413  The same holds true for faculty members as well. Faculty members who have been hired 
based on their expertise are in a much stronger position when they can demonstrate that the 
classroom speech and teaching methods they employ are effective and efficient means of 
achieving the educational outcomes set by the university. 
n414  Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001). 
n415  In Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, the Court analogizes broadcasters, who 
must choose among speakers expressing different viewpoints, with university administrators, 
who must select speakers for commencement or a lecture series, and public schools that 
prescribe their curriculum. 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
 
 
 
59 
 
n416  See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543. 
n417  See id. 
n418  See Ward Churchills, supra note 107, at 3-4. 
n419  The inclusion of black studies, for example, was a response to a multi-racial movement for 
social justice that was aided by "white philanthropic organizations." See Noliwe M. Rooks, The 
Beginnings of Black Studies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 2006, at B8-B9. 
n420  See Scott Jaschik, Hoover in the Heartland, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 20, 2007, 
available at http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/09/20/illinois; Robin Wilson, New 
Centers Bring Tradition to Study of U.S. History, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 16, 2007, 
available at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i28/28a01002.htm. 
n421  See Neil Gross & Solon Simmons, The Social and Political Views of American Professors, 
Working Paper, Sept. 24, 2007, at 29-30, available at 
http://www.insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2007/10/08/politics. 
n422  Id. at 29. 
n423  Id. 
n424  Id. at 50. 
n425  Trends in Political Values and Core Attitudes: 1987-2007: Political Landscape More 
Favorable to Democrats, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Mar. 
22, 2007, at 36, available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=312. 
n426  See id. 
n427  Id. The biggest generation gap, however, remains between the Baby Boomers (19461964) 
and those who came before them. Id. 
n428  See supra text accompanying note 50. 
n429  A Portrait of "Generation Next": How Young People View Their Lives, Futures and 
Politics, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, Jan. 9, 2007, at 3, 
available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=300. 
n430  See id. at 3-6. 
 
 
 
60 
 
n431  Id. at 4. 
n432  See Zipp & Fenwick, supra note 7, at 305-06. 
n433  Id. at 316. 
n434  Id. 
n435  Id. 
n436  See infra text accompanying notes 438-39. 
n437  See Zipp & Fenwick, supra note 7, at 320. 
n438  See Sandy Baum & Jennifer Ma, Education Pays 2007: The Benefits of Higher Education 
for Individuals and Society, COLLEGE BOARD, 2007, at 2, 12, 18-23, 25-27, available at 
http://www.collegeboard.com/press/releases/185478.html. 
n439  See id. at 2, 28. 
n440  See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.11 (1975). 
n441  See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (explaining that the 
"right to think is the beginning of freedom ... and speech is the beginning of thought") 
 
